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In the current study, we examine the effect of physical coldness on personal
moral dilemma judgment. Previous studies have indicated that utilitarian moral
judgment—sacrificing a few people to achieve the greater good for others—was facilitated
when: (1) participants suppressed an initial emotional response and deliberately thought
about the utility of outcomes; (2) participants had a high-level construal mindset and
focused on abstract goals (e.g., save many); or (3) there was a decreasing emotional
response to sacrificing a few. In two experiments, we exposed participants to extreme
cold or typical room temperature and then asked them to make personal moral dilemma
judgments. The results of Experiment 1 indicated that coldness prompted utilitarian
judgment, but the effect of coldness was independent from deliberate thought or abstract
high-level construal mindset. As Experiment 2 revealed, coldness facilitated utilitarian
judgment via reduced empathic feelings. Therefore, physical coldness did not affect the
“cool-headed” deliberate process or the abstract high-level construal mindset. Rather,
coldness biased people toward being “cold-hearted,” reduced empathetic concern, and
facilitated utilitarian moral judgments.
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INTRODUCTION
Personal moral dilemma tasks examine whether it is permissible
to sacrifice a few people for the sake of the greater good. For exam-
ple, the footbridge dilemma scenario asks whether you would
push an innocent person on a footbridge into the path of runway
trolley and kill them in order to save five other lives (Thomson,
1976). Based on the situation, people may think of killing this one
innocent person in one of two ways—as either “cold-hearted” or
“cool-headed.” Studies of embodied cognition have revealed that
such “cold-warm” expression is not just a metaphor, but temper-
ature perception can affect social judgment (Williams and Bargh,
2008); thus, the present study tested the effect of temperature
perception on moral dilemma judgment.
There are two common ways to make a moral dilemma judg-
ment, and the dual process theory of moral judgment suggests
that different processes are engaged in each judgment (e.g.,
Greene et al., 2004). Deontological judgments prefer the rights
of the individual (e.g., “It’s wrong to push the man”) and relate to
intuitive and emotional process such as empathetic concern for a
victim. In contrast, utilitarian judgments favor the greater good
(e.g., “It’s better to save the five”) and relate to a deliberate pro-
cess of suppressing initial emotional responses and calculating the
utility of the outcomes (Greene et al., 2001, 2008) showed that
personal moral dilemmas activated the brain regions in which
emotional responses occur (e.g., the medial frontal gyrus, pos-
terior cingulate gyrus, and angular gyrus) and produced more
deontological judgment than moral dilemma scenarios without
salient emotional content. Greene et al. (2004) argued that there
are conflict between evolutionally-old socio-emotional responses
(deontological) and recently-evolved abstract reasoning (utilitar-
ian) in personal moral dilemma task, and brain regions, which
related with cognitive conflict (anterior cingulate cortex) and cog-
nitive control (dorsolateral prefrontal cortex), were activated for
answering utilitarian judgment in difficult personal moral dilem-
mas. Many studies also supported the relation between deliberate
process and utilitarian judgment in high-conflict personal moral
dilemmas; for example, cognitive load increased response times
in utilitarian judgment (Greene et al., 2008), induced time pres-
sure to answer quickly and intuitively increased deontological
judgment (Suter and Hertwig, 2011), and a tendency toward a
“need for cognition” was related to utilitarian judgment (Bartels,
2008).
Recent studies have shown that psychological distance and
construal level also affect moral judgments. According to the con-
strual level theory (Trope and Liberman, 2010), psychological
distance is an egocentric representation that something is close
or far away from the self, and psychological distance relates to
levels of construal. A distant representation is linked to high-
level construal, which is relatively abstract and focuses on distant
goals. On the other hand, a close representation is linked to
low-level construal, which is relatively concrete and focuses on
the immediate means (Fujita et al., 2006). Eyal et al. (2008)
argued that general moral rules (e.g., “it is wrong to steal,”
“donating to charity is noble”) are related to high-level construal,
whereas context-specific considerations are related to low-level
construal.
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In moral dilemma judgment, utilitarian judgments give
priority to the ends (e.g., “to save many people”) and relate to
high-level construal, whereas deontological judgments often give
priority to the means (e.g., “to not push and kill an innocent
man”) and relate to low-level construal. Aguilar et al. (2013)
showed that psychologically distant event representations, such
as temporally and spatially distant events, prompt utilitarian
decisions. Amit and Greene (2012) reported that visual process-
ing, which is more concrete than verbal processing, is positively
related to deontological judgment. The relationship between
construal level and the intuitive-deliberative process in moral
judgment has been the source of controversy. Amit and Greene
(2012) argued that construal level and dual processes were inter-
related; i.e., the low-level construal features of the scenario (e.g.,
how to sacrifice the victim) triggered intuitive and emotional
responses. On the other hand, Eyal et al. (2008) discussed the dis-
tinction between general and rule-based moral judgments (high
level construal) vs. contextually based moral judgment (low level
construal), which is not related to cognitive effort.
Several studies have indicated an alternative route to utili-
tarian judgment. In these findings, utilitarian judgments arise
not only from a “cool-headed,” deliberate process or high-level
construal mindset, but they also arise from a “cold-hearted”
deficit of empathic concern and social emotion. For example,
utilitarian judgment in a personal moral dilemma situation has
been positively correlated with antisocial personality traits, such
as psychopathy (Bartels and Pizarro, 2011) and psychoticism
(Wiech et al., 2013), or with a reduction of “empathic con-
cern” (Gleichgerrcht and Young, 2013). In addition, damage of
ventromedial prefrontal cortex, which involves socially related
emotions, produced more utilitarian judgment (Koenigs et al.,
2007) and failed to generate a skin conductance response before
making utilitarian judgment (Moretto et al., 2010). Wiech et al.
(2013) suggested that reduced empathic concern and a reduc-
tion in emotional aversion to harming others facilitate utilitarian
judgment without engaging deliberate processes.
Studies have also shown a relationship between moral judg-
ment and embodied cognition. In a personal moral dilemma
situation, scenarios with physical contact (Cushman et al., 2006)
or personal force, in which the victims are sacrificed by the agent’s
muscle (e.g., by pushing), resulted in fewer utilitarian judgments
(Greene et al., 2009). For example, in footbridge dilemmas, it was
less acceptable to drop a victim by pushing him than by using a
trap door and a remote switch. However, the effect of embodi-
ment on moral dilemma judgment was not clear from the results
of these studies.
Studies of embodiment cognition show that temperature
perception influences interpersonal relationships. Williams and
Bargh (2008) showed that, compared with physical coldness,
physical warmth prompted positive impressions toward a target
person and increased prosocial behavior. Physical warmth fur-
ther prompted close social proximity toward the target person
(IJzerman and Semin, 2009; Fay and Maner, 2012). Conversely,
inducing social closeness leads people to perceive higher ambient
temperatures (IJzerman and Semin, 2010), and social exclusion
induces perceptions of physical coldness (Zhong and Leonardelli,
2008). Williams et al. (2009) explained the interrelations between
bodily state and cognition on the basis of scaffolding processes.
Scaffolding processes are refers to the processes which people
integrate incoming information with extant knowledge structure,
especially in early childhood. For example, the abstract concept
of psychological distance (e.g., interpersonal proximity) is scaf-
folded upon the perceptual and body-based information (e.g.,
close physical contact, warm sensations). The link between phys-
ical warmth and social relation is said to be very basic, because
social relations are learned through bodily contact and sensing
others’ body temperature in early in life (Williams and Bargh,
2008; Williams et al., 2009; IJzerman and Koole, 2011; Fay and
Maner, 2012). For example, Bowlby (1969) suggested that an
innate need for direct physical contact with a caretaker involves
the experience of physical warmth. Harlow’s (1958) study showed
that young monkeys preferred to stay close to a warm cloth surro-
gate mother rather than a cold wire mother, and monkeys raised
with the cold wire mother had trouble with social development.
The aim of the current study is to examine the effect of temper-
ature perception on moral dilemma judgment. For this purpose,
we exposed participants to either extreme cold or typical room
temperature and then asked them to respond to personal moral
dilemmas. We hypothesized two possible relationships between
physical coldness and moral dilemma judgment. One is that cold
temperature may affect moral judgment via inducing a high-level
construal mindset. Construal level theory suggests that various
psychological distances (e.g., spatial, temporal, and social) are
interrelated and connected with levels of construal (Trope and
Liberman, 2010). Physical coldness cues social distance from the
target (IJzerman and Semin, 2009), and social distance connects
with high-level construal mindsets; therefore, physical coldness
may facilitate a focus on abstract goals and prompt utilitarian
moral judgments. Furthermore, there is a possible relationship
between construal level and dual processes in moral judgment
(Amit and Greene, 2012); therefore, a high construal feature of
the scenario may trigger deliberate and effortful thought. It is pre-
dicted that participants with a high-level construal mindset may
take more time and thus make more utilitarian choices.
The other possible relationship is that of cold temperatures
prompting utilitarian moral judgment via reducing empathic
concerns toward sacrificing people. IJzerman and Koole (2011)
pointed that physical warmth is relevant to communal shar-
ing relationships in relational models theory (Haslam and Fiske,
1999; Fiske, 2004). Communal sharing relationships are altruis-
tic relationships such as are experienced by families and close
friends, and communal sharing relationships are often con-
structed through bonding experiences such as intimate touch, sex,
and nursing. Rai and Fiske (2011) discussed the links between
relational model andmoral motives, and they said that communal
sharing relationships are connected by the Unity moral motive,
which is directed toward caring for in-groups through a sense
of collective responsibility and common fate. The unity moral
motive fosters caring for others in the group who are in need or
those who have been harmed; thus, unity facilitates compassion
and empathic emotions. If physical warmth and social proximity
are the basis for communal sharing relationships and their cor-
responding moral motive of unity, coldness may decrease unity
motives and their related emotions, such as empathy, compassion,
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and emotional aversion to harming others. Therefore, it is pre-
dicted that physical coldness may increase social distance and
decrease empathic concern toward the sacrificed victim, thereby
reducing the conflict between empathic-deontological judgment
vs. utilitarian judgment. Consequently, coldness may facilitate
utilitarian judgment without engaging deliberate thought and the
high-level construal mindset.
EXPERIMENT 1
Experiment 1 aimed to test the effect of coldness on high-conflict
personal moral dilemma judgment and whether the effect of cold-
ness is related to construal level and deliberate thought. According
to the construal level theory, utilitarian judgment relates to
abstract high-level construal features (Aguilar et al., 2013). If
coldness fosters social distance and increases psychological dis-
tance, it may set participants in a higher-level construal mindset
and facilitate utilitarian judgment. It was argued that construal
level and dual processes were interrelated (Amit and Greene,
2012), and it is possible that high-level construal and the abstract
feature of the scenario may trigger deliberate thought. Therefore,
we predict that, compared with room temperature, participants
in the colder temperature condition may show more high-level
construal mindset, take more time, and make more utilitarian
judgments for high-conflict personal moral dilemmas. In addi-
tion, as in previous studies, participants who are in a high-level
construal mindset (Aguilar et al., 2013) or who take more time to
answer the dilemmas (Suter and Hertwig, 2011) may show more
utilitarian judgment in both temperature conditions.
In this experiment, we presented high-conflict personal moral
scenarios as target stimuli, and we presented low-conflict personal
moral scenarios as fillers. High-conflict personal moral scenarios
evoked competition between deontological judgment and utili-
tarian judgment, whereas low-conflict personal moral scenarios
lacked this degree of competition. It was showed that almost
all the participants produced deontological judgment, and judg-
ment latency was faster in the low-conflict scenario than in the
high-conflict scenario (Koenigs et al., 2007). In addition, patients
with lesions in vmPFC, a brain region necessary for the gener-
ation of social emotions, produced more utilitarian judgment in
high-conflict moral dilemma situations than healthy controls, but
both vmPFC patients and healthy controls produced deontologi-
cal judgment in the low-conflict situation (Koenigs et al., 2007;
Moretto et al., 2010). Therefore, all participants may endorse
deontological judgment in low-conflict personal moral scenar-
ios, and the effect of physical coldness may be observable only
in high-conflict personal moral scenarios.
METHODS
Participants
This study was approved by the faculty ethics committee, and
all participants provided informed consent. Forty-seven Japanese
undergraduates (Mage = 19.37, SDage = 1.25; 24 female, 23
male) participated in the study in exchange for a partial course
credit. One participant was excluded for misunderstanding the
instructions. Simmons et al. (2011) suggest that the experimenter
must collect at least 20 observations per cell in order to have
enough power to detect most effects; therefore, we gathered data
from 23 participants for each condition.
Measures
Moral judgment task. The scenarios were randomly selected
from a battery of 60 moral dilemmas developed by Greene
et al. (2001). They were translated into Japanese and checked
by an English-Japanese bilingual speaker. The target stimuli in
the present study were 13 high-conflict personal moral dilem-
mas: Sacrifice, Crying Baby, Footbridge, Vaccine Test, Sophie’s
Choice, Lifeboat, Ecologists, Vitamins, Euthanasia, Lawrence
of Arabia, Submarine, Bomb, and Preventing the Spread. We
also presented eight low-conflict personal moral dilemmas to
reduce repetition: Country Road, Plane Crash, Hired Rapist,
Infanticide, Architect, Hard Times, Transplant, and Smother for
dollars.
Behavior identification form. To measure construal level, we
translated 25 items from the Behavior Identification Form (BIF;
Vallacher and Wegner, 1989) into Japanese. The BIF presents 25
items about a target behavior (e.g., “locking a door”) and asks
which one of two alternate descriptions the participants preferred.
One described the behavior in terms of its concrete means (e.g.,
“putting a key in the lock”), and the other described it in terms
of abstract outcome (e.g., “securing the house”). An overall score
was obtained by adding the number of abstract high-level descrip-
tions selected by a respondent across 25 behaviors. This score
total was used as an index of level of action identification. Scores
ranged from 0 to 25, with higher scores indicating stronger pref-
erences for high-level action identifications. Thus, these scores
were an index of a high-level construal mindset (Fujita et al.,
2006).
Positive and negative affect scales. The 16-item Japanese version
of Positive and Negative Affect Scales (PANAS) asks participants
to report the extent to which, at the present moment, they feel the
8 positive (active, proud, strong, attentive, determined, interested,
alert, enthusiastic) and 8 negative (scared, afraid, upset, nervous,
distress, jittery, ashamed, irritable) emotions on a 6-point scale
(1 = Strongly disagree, 6 = Strongly agree) (Tellegen et al., 1988;
Sato and Yasuda, 2001).
PROCEDURE
A desktop computer with E-Prime software (Psychology Software
Tools, 2002, Pittsburgh, PA) controlled the presentation of stim-
uli, timing operation, and data collection. Each participant
entered a quiet room with a typical room temperature one by
one, and they sat in front of a computer screen throughout the
experiment. The experimenter also stayed in the room during
the experiment for instructing and to confirm the participants’
understanding of the task.
The current experiment was presented as two unrelated stud-
ies. One was ostensibly a “commercial product evaluation” study,
and the second was a “judgment” study. Because present study
asked more questions than previous studies, we modified temper-
ature manipulation procedure of previous studies, which manip-
ulated the temperature by holding a cup with warm or cold water
(e.g., Williams and Bargh, 2008; IJzerman and Semin, 2009). In
present study, participants were asked to keep wearing the scarf
with frozen internal water packs or internal water packs at room
temperature during the experiment.
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Participants were asked to answer “commercial product eval-
uation” study. First, participants answered the PANAS: each
emotion was presented on a single screen with the scales at the
bottom, and there was no time limit. Then, participants were
given a scarf with either frozen internal water packs (the cold con-
dition) or internal water packs at room temperature (ordinary
“room temperature” condition). The participants were instructed
to put the scarf around their necks and to answer 10 ques-
tions about the scarf (e.g., “This scarf is the right size”) on a
7-point scale (1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly agree). The
product evaluation section included one question about prod-
uct temperature: “This scarf is cold.” Each product evaluation
question was presented on a single screen with the scales at
the bottom, and there was no time limit. After the product
evaluation questions, they answered the second round of the
PANAS. The participants were told that this product evaluation
study also examined the prolonged use of the scarf. The exper-
imenter asked them to keep wearing the scarf and to join a
judgment study, which was not related to the product evaluation
study.
In the judgment study, participants responded to 21 moral
dilemma scenarios. Procedure of moral dilemma judgment was
based on Moretto et al. (2010). Each dilemma was presented as
text through a series of two screens. The first screen described the
scenario and was presented for 45 s. The second screen posed a
question, and the participants judged the moral acceptability of
the proposed utilitarian action in each dilemma using a 7-point
scale (1 = completely inappropriate, 7 = completely appropriate),
and their response times were measured. There was no time limit.
Participants were told to respond as soon as they had reached a
decision. In the inter-trial interval, a blank screen was displayed
for 1 s.
Following the moral dilemma task, participants completed the
BIF task. Each target behavior was presented on a single screen
with the two options at the bottom. There was no time limit.
Participants then responded to the product evaluation questions
again and answered 10 questions about the scarf. The final task
was to complete the third round of the PANAS. After the experi-
ment, the participants were thanked and debriefed. Participants
were explained purpose of the experiment, and asked whether
they were suspicious about the relation between product evalu-
ation task (temperature manipulation) and judgment task. None
of the participants reported being suspicious about the experi-




Reaction times (RTs) of the moral judgment were natural log
transformed before analysis, and mean RTs were obtained via
inverse transformation. Table 1 shows the means and 95% con-
fidence intervals of room temperature, coldness rating, BIF score,
PANAS scores, and RTs both in the cold and ordinary room
temperature conditions.
There was no significant difference in room temperature
between the cold and ordinary room temperature condition,
t(44) = 0.45, p = 0.652, d = 0.14. The scarf with frozen internal
Table 1 | Means and 95% confidence intervals (CIs) of temperature,
coldness rating, BIF score, PANAS scores, and RTs in cold and
ordinary temperature conditions in Experiment 1.
Measures Cold Ordinary
Mean 95% CI Mean 95% CI
Room
temperature
(Celsius) 22.09 21.04 23.14 21.74 20.55 22.93
Coldness
rating
1st 6.65 6.44 6.86 5.52 4.85 6.20
2nd 6.22 5.78 6.65 4.30 3.53 5.08
BIF score 9.83 7.93 11.72 9.61 7.79 11.42
RTs (ms) Low conflict 4248 4504
High conflict 5042 5580
PANAS 1st Positive 2.89 2.64 3.14 2.89 2.52 3.27
Negative 2.34 1.98 2.71 2.26 1.89 2.64
PANAS 2nd Positive 2.67 2.36 2.98 2.66 2.28 3.04
Negative 2.20 1.84 2.56 2.03 1.67 2.39
PANAS 3rd Positive 2.40 2.11 2.68 2.28 1.79 2.77
Negative 2.32 1.86 2.77 2.20 1.84 2.56
water packs was evaluated to be colder than the scarf with internal
water packs at room temperature, both immediately after the par-
ticipants started wearing it, t(44) = 3.31, p = 0.002, d = 0.98, and
after they finished the moral judgment task and BIF, t(44) = 3.31,
p = 0.002, d = 0.98.
Moral judgment
The mean ratings of moral acceptability for each type of dilemma
for each participant were analyzed (Figure 1). A Two-by-Two
analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted. Temperature (cold,
ordinary) was the between-participants factor, and moral sce-
nario (high conflict, low conflict) was the within-participants
factor. We also calculated Cousineau-Morey-Baguley’s difference-
adjusted normalized confidence intervals. There was a significant
effect of moral scenario F(1, 44) = 360.89, p < 0.001, η2g = 0.69,
a marginally significant effect of temperature F(1, 44) = 3.81, p =
0.057, η2g = 0.06, and an interaction between temperature and
scenario F(1, 44) = 3.67, p = 0.062, η2g = 0.02. A simple main
effect of temperature was significant in the high-conflict scenario
F(1, 44) = 5.91, p = 0.019, η2g = 0.12, but it was not significant
in the low-conflict scenario F(1, 44) = 0.54, p = 0.464, η2g = 0.01.
The participants made more utilitarian judgments in the cold
temperature condition than in the ordinary temperature con-
dition for high-conflict moral dilemmas, Mcold = 4.09 [95%
CI: 3.95, 4.24], Mordinary = 3.59 [3.44, 3.74], but not for low-
conflict moral dilemmas, Mcold = 2.02 [1.88, 2.17], Mordinary =
1.90 [1.79, 2.04]. As in previous studies (Koenigs et al., 2007;
Moretto et al., 2010), deontological judgments were dominant
in the low-conflict personal moral dilemma scenarios, regard-
less of temperature manipulation; therefore, subsequent analysis
focused on the results of high-conflict personal moral dilemmas.
Construal level and RTs
Path analysis was used to test whether the effect of coldness on
high-conflict personal moral dilemma was mediated by construal
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level and RTs (Figure 2). The results indicated coldness did
not have a significant effect on BIF β = 0.03, p = 0.862, and
there were no significant effects of BIF scores on RTs β =
0.04, p = 0.784 and moral dilemma judgment β = 0.21, p =
0.110. Furthermore, there was no significant effect of RTs on
high-conflict personal moral dilemma judgments β = 0.14, p =
0.283. Coldness directly facilitated the acceptability of utilitarian
judgment β = 0.36, p = 0.008.
We also conducted a multiple regression analysis to test the
differences between the cold and room temperature conditions’
in effect of construal level and the RTs on moral judgment. In
the ordinary room temperature condition, construal level and
RTs predicted 16% of the variance, adjR2 = 0.16, F(2, 20) = 3.08,
p = 0.068, and BIF score significantly predicted acceptance of a
utilitarian judgment, β = 0.49, p = 0.022, VIF = 1.02, while RTs
did not, β = −0.09, p = 0.648, VIF = 1.02. On the other hand,
in the cold temperature condition, construal level and RTs did not
significantly explain the variance, adjR2 = 0.005, F(2, 20) = 1.05,
p = 0.368, and neither BIF score, β = 0.04, p = 0.850, VIF =
1.00, nor RTs, β = 0.31, p = 0.164, VIF = 1.00, predicted moral
acceptability.
FIGURE 1 | Mean moral acceptability ratings and 95% CI
(Cousineau-Morey-Baguley’s Difference-Adjusted Normalized
Confidence Intervals) as functions of temperature and moral scenario.
Affective state
Analysis of the PANAS scores showed that there were no
statistically significant effects of temperature cue on the positive-
negative affective state at the start of the experiment [posi-
tive t(44) = 0.02, p = 0.980, d = 0.01; negative t(44) = 0.32, p =
0.749, d = 0.10], or after the physical temperature was manipu-
lated [positive t(44) = 0.07, p = 0.945, d = 0.02; negative t(44) =
0.71, p = 0.481, d = 0.21], or after the moral judgment task
[t(44) = 0.42, p = 0.676, d = 0.12; negative t(44) = 0.43, p =
0.669, d = 0.13]. There were no significant correlations between
acceptability of a utilitarian decision in high-conflict moral
dilemmas and positive or negative affective state before the moral
judgment was made (2nd round of PANAS): rpositive = 0.10, p =
0.496, rnegative = 0.07, p = 0.655.
DISCUSSION
We found that physical coldness facilitated utilitarian moral judg-
ment in high-conflict personal moral dilemmas, but the cold
cue had no significant effect on affective state, construal level,
or moral judgment latency. A high-level construal mindset was
related to utilitarian judgment in only the ordinary room tem-
perature condition, while there was no significant relationship
between high-level construal and RTs. These results imply that
physical coldness and high-level construal did not prompt delib-
erate thought; rather, they might decrease the empathic concern
and emotional aversion to sacrificing.
The effect of the cold temperature, which was independent
from that of construal level and RTs, implicated that cold-
ness facilitated utilitarian judgment via reducing empathic con-
cerns. Warmth is related to communal sharing relationships
and unity moral motives, which link empathy and compassion
(IJzerman and Koole, 2011; Rai and Fiske, 2011), and lack of
empathic concern directs utilitarian moral judgment without
engaging deliberate processes (Wiech et al., 2013). Participants
in the cold condition could easily make a utilitarian moral
judgment because they did not need to evoke the deliberate
process in order to suppress an emotional response. In addi-
tion, even though the low-level construal mindset focused on
concrete means, it might be hard to trigger an empathic deon-
tological response in the cold condition. Therefore, coldness
prompted utilitarian judgment, regardless of RTs and construal
level.
FIGURE 2 | Standardized coefficients for the relationship between temperature cue and moral acceptability as mediated by construal level (BIF
scores) and RTs. All paths are included in the model. Solid line indicated p < 0.10, and dashed line indicated p ≥ 0.10.
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In the room temperature condition, high-level construal
mindset predicted utilitarian judgment, while no effect of RTs on
moral dilemma judgment was observed. Eyal et al. (2008) posited
that the distinction between moral judgments based on high-
and low-level construal is not related to the distinction between
effortless intuition-based judgment and the reflective reasoning
process. Participants in the high-level construal mindset might
paymore attention to abstract utilitarian features rather than con-
crete deontological features; thus, the emotional-deontological
response was not strongly triggered. Consequently, the conflict
between deontological and utilitarian judgments might be low
in the high-level construal mindset; therefore, the high-level
construal could direct utilitarian judgment without engaging
deliberate processes.
Contrary to our prediction, we did not observe any effect
of coldness on construal level. There may be individual differ-
ences in the relationship between temperature perception and
psychological distance other than social distance. For example,
cold temperature is temporally closer than a warmer temperature
in the winter season; therefore, it is possible that even though a
cold cue increased social distance, it is not associated with other
psychological distance dimensions.
In summary, the results of Experiment 1 showed that cold-
ness facilitates utilitarian judgment regardless of affective states,
deliberate thought, and abstract high-level construal mindset. In
Experiment 2, we examined whether coldness puts people in a
“cold-hearted” state. We tested the effect of coldness on social dis-
tance and empathic concern for victims potentially sacrificed in a
moral dilemma judgment.
EXPERIMENT 2
Experiment 2 tested whether coldness affects moral dilemma
judgment via reducing empathic concern for potentially sacri-
ficed victims. Temperature perception affects social distance, and
it is related to unity moral motives, which link empathy and
compassion (IJzerman and Semin, 2009; Rai and Fiske, 2011).
Furthermore, reduction of empathic concern and emotional aver-
sion to harming others were related to an increased utilitarian
moral judgment (e.g., Gleichgerrcht and Young, 2013; Wiech
et al., 2013). We hypothesized that physical coldness may increase
social distance from the sacrificed victims and may decrease
empathic feelings, thus facilitating utilitarian decisions in high-
conflict personal moral dilemma judgments. In addition, we
examined whether coldness directly decreased empathic feelings.
Even though the relationship between temperature and empathy
stems from social proximity, it is possible that the tempera-
ture cue may directly activate empathy-related concepts, such as




This study was approved by the faculty ethics committee, and all
the participants provided informed consent. Forty-one Japanese
undergraduates (Mage = 19.73, SDage = 1.12; 17 female, 24
male) participated in Experiment 2 in exchange for a partial
course credit.
Measures
Moral judgment task. The target stimuli in the present study
were eight high-conflict personal moral dilemmas, and we added
eight low-conflict personal moral dilemmas to reduce repeti-
tion. The high-conflict moral dilemma scenarios: were Crying
Baby, Footbridge, Sophie’s Choice, Vitamins, Lawrence of Arabia,
Submarine, Bomb, and Preventing the Spread. The low-conflict
personal moral dilemmas were the same as in Experiment 1.
Inclusion of other in the self-scale. To measure the social dis-
tance from the sacrificed individuals, we asked the participants to
remember the moral dilemma scenarios as a whole and then rate
the overlap between themselves and the people who were going
to be sacrificed in the moral dilemma scenarios on the 7-point
Inclusion of Other in the Self (IOS) scale (Aron et al., 1992).
The IOS measures the level at which “the other is included in
the self,” and this scale presented seven diagrams of two circles
varying in their degree of overlap. The overlap between the circles
represented inclusion and social distance (lower scores indicated
greater social distance).
Empathy scale. To test the empathic feelings during the moral
dilemma judgment, we presented four empathy-related adjec-
tives: sympathetic, compassionate, softhearted, and tender (Zhou
et al., 2012). The participants were asked to rate the extent
to which they had experienced the four emotional states while
answering the moral dilemma task on a 7-point scale (1 = not
at all, 7 = very much).
Procedure
This procedure was almost the same as in Experiment 1. This
experiment was presented as two unrelated studies. One was
ostensibly a “commercial product evaluation” study, and the sec-
ond was a “judgment” study. First, the participants were asked to
participate in a “commercial product evaluation” study and were
given a scarf with either frozen internal water packs or internal
water packs at room temperature. They were instructed to put the
scarf around their necks and answer 7 questions about the scarf
(e.g., “This scarf is the right size”) on a 7-point scale (1= Strongly
disagree, 7 = Strongly agree). At this point, to remove any possible
interfering effects from the associative network of temperature-
related words, we did not ask questions about temperature before
the moral judgment task. After the product evaluation questions,
the participants answered the PANAS. Then, they were told that
this product evaluation study also examined the prolonged use
of the scarf and that they were to keep wearing the scarf. Then,
the experimenter asked to join a judgment study that was not
related to the product evaluation study. In this study, the par-
ticipants responded to 16 moral dilemma scenarios. Following
the moral dilemma task, the participants completed the IOS scale
and an empathy rating. Participants then responded to the prod-
uct evaluation questions again and answered 10 questions about
the scarf. The second round product evaluation section included
one question about product temperature: “This scarf is cold.” The
final task was to complete the second round of the PANAS. After
the experiment, the participants were thanked and debriefed.
None of them reported being suspicious about the experimental
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purpose. Participants took about 40min to complete the all
tasks.
RESULTS
Table 2 shows the means and 95% confidence intervals of temper-
ature, coldness rating, IOS scale, Empathy scale, PANAS scores,
and RTs both in the cold and the ordinary room temperature
conditions. RTs were natural log transformed before analysis, and
mean RTs were obtained via inverse transformation.
Manipulation check
There was no significant difference in room temperature between
the cold and ordinary room temperature conditions, t(39) = 0.30,
p = 0.763, d = 0.10. The scarf with the frozen internal water
packs was evaluated to be colder than the scarf with internal water
packs at room temperature, t(39) = 9.39, p < 0.001, d = 3.01.
Moral judgment
The mean ratings of moral acceptability for each type of
dilemma for each participant were analyzed. A Two-by-Two
ANOVA was conducted. Temperature (cold, ordinary) was the
between-participants factor and moral scenario (high conflict,
Table 2 | Means and 95% CIs of temperature, coldness rating, moral
acceptability, IOS scale, Empathy scale, PANAS scores, and RTs in
cold and ordinary room temperature conditions in Experiment 2.
Cold Ordinary
Measures Mean 95% CI Mean 95% CI
Room temperature (Celsius) 27.43 27.03 27.83 27.50 27.22 27.78
Coldness rating 6.38 5.96 6.80 2.80 2.11 3.49
Moral acceptability Low conflict 1.90 1.71 2.09 1.74 1.62 1.87
High conflict 3.97 3.78 4.16 3.40 3.27 3.53
RTs (ms) Low conflict 4092 3881
High conflict 5382 5152
IOS scale 3.33 2.45 4.21 3.85 2.98 4.71
Empathy scale 3.24 2.80 3.68 3.79 3.28 4.29
PANAS 1st Positive 2.44 2.08 2.81 2.43 2.09 2.77
Negative 2.03 1.73 2.33 2.19 1.94 2.43
PANAS 2nd Positive 2.14 1.78 2.51 2.27 1.91 2.63
Negative 2.32 1.86 2.77 2.20 1.84 2.56
low conflict) was the within-participants factor. The main effects
of moral scenario, F(1, 39) = 285.86, p < 0.001, η2g = 0.71, and
temperature, F(1, 39) = 5.33, p = 0.026, η2g = 0.08, were signifi-
cant, and the interaction between temperature and scenario was
marginally significant, F(1, 39) = 3.54, p = 0.067, η2g = 0.03. A
simple main effect of temperature was significant in the high-
conflict scenario F(1, 39) = 6.45, p = 0.015, η2g = 0.14, while
effect of temperature was not significant in the low-conflict sce-
nario, F(1, 39) = 1.03, p = 0.315, η2g = 0.03. Participants made
more utilitarian judgments in the cold temperature condition
than in the room temperature condition for high-conflict moral
dilemmas. As in Experiment 1, further analysis was conducted on
the high-conflict dilemmas.
Social distance and empathy
Path analysis was used to test whether the effect of coldness on
high-conflict personal moral dilemma judgment was mediated by
social distance toward sacrificing victims and empathic feelings
(Figure 3). The results indicated that coldness had a marginally
significant effect on empathy β = −0.27, p = 0.082, and cold-
ness positively affected the acceptability of utilitarian decisions
β = 0.29, p = 0.045. Empathy negatively affected the acceptabil-
ity of utilitarian decisions β = −0.33, p = 0.022, while coldness
did not affect social distance β = −0.14, p = 0.375, and social
distance did not affect empathy β = 0.01, p = 0.930. To exam-
ine whether empathy mediated the effect of coldness on moral
acceptability, we conducted a bootstrapping analysis with 1,000
bootstrapped samples. The indirect effect between coldness and
moral acceptability as mediated through empathy was marginally
significant: β = 0.09 in a point estimate, SE = 0.07, and a 95% CI
was−0.01 to 0.269, and a 90%CI was 0.001 to 0.232.We also con-
ducted bootstrapping analysis to test a total effect of coldness on
moral acceptability. The total effect of coldness on moral accept-
ability was significant: β = 0.38 in a point estimate, SE = 0.12
and 95% CI was 0.108 to 0.579.
RTs
A Two-by-Two ANOVA was conducted for RTs. Temperature
(cold, ordinary) was the between-participants factor, and moral
scenario (high conflict, low conflict) was the within-participants
factor. The main effects of moral scenario were signifi-
cant, F(1, 39) = 44.84, p < 0.001, η2g = 0.11, while the effect
FIGURE 3 | Standardized coefficients for the relationship between temperature cue and moral acceptability as mediated by social distance (IOS
scores) and empathy. All paths are included in the model. Solid line indicated p < 0.10, and dashed line indicated p ≥ 0.10.
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of temperature, F(1, 39) = 0.17, p = 0.676, η2g = 0.004, and the
interaction between temperature and scenario were not signif-
icant, F(1, 39) = 0.01, p = 0.912, η2g < 0.001. The RTs of the
low-conflict moral dilemmas were faster than those of the high-
conflict moral dilemmas. There were no significant correlations
between acceptability of utilitarian decision in moral dilemmas
and RTs: rlow−conflict = 0.09, p = 0.582, rhigh−conflict = −0.07,
p = 0.683.
Affective state
Analysis of the PANAS scores showed that there were no
statistically significant effects of temperature cues on the positive-
negative affective state after physical temperature was manipu-
lated [positive t(39) = 0.04, p = 0.970, d = 0.012; negative t(39) =
0.85, p = 0.403, d = 0.21], or after themoral judgment task [pos-
itive t(39) = 0.51, p = 0.611, d = 0.16; negative t(39) = 0.61, p =
0.543, d = 0.27]. There were no significant correlations between
the acceptability of utilitarian decisions in high-conflict moral
dilemmas and positive or negative affective state before the moral
judgment (1st round of PANAS): rpositive = 0.10, p = 0.548,
rnegative = −0.12, p = 0.468.
DISCUSSION
The results of Experiment 2 partially support the hypothesis that
coldness facilitated utilitarian judgment through reducing empa-
thy. What is more, the direct effect of coldness on moral dilemma
judgments was also significant. Contrary to our prediction, there
was no significant effect of coldness on social distance, and effect
of social distance on empathic feelings was not significant. As
in Experiment 1, effects of coldness on judgment latency and
affective states were not observed.
Previous studies showed that lack of empathy and emotional
aversion to harming others prompted utilitarian judgment (e.g.,
Gleichgerrcht and Young, 2013; Wiech et al., 2013). Empathy is
connected with unity moral motives, which motivates individuals
to take care of people in communal sharing relationships, such as
families and close friendships (Rai and Fiske, 2011). Communal
sharing relationships aremade up of bonding experiences, includ-
ing bodily touching (IJzerman and Koole, 2011). The results of
Experiment 2 were compatible with these views: coldness reduced
empathic feelings, and reduction of empathic feelings prompted
utilitarian judgment. However the effect of coldness on empa-
thy did not reach statistically significant effect (β = −0.27, p =
0.082). One possible explanation is that this experiment presented
an explicit questionnaire to measure empathy. The emotional
processes in moral dilemma judgment are fast and automatic
(Greene et al., 2004, 2008), the relationship between tempera-
ture and social cognition is said to be very basic (IJzerman and
Koole, 2011), and studies of embodied cognition indicate that
participants were not aware of the effect of bodily state (Barsalou,
2008; Williams and Bargh, 2008). Together with this, it is possi-
ble that coldness prompts utilitarian judgment via unconscious
emotional processes, and participants’ subjective report of their
empathic state could not fully reflect this unconscious process.
The direct effect of coldness on moral dilemma judgment might
reflect such unconscious effects of physical temperature on moral
dilemma judgment.
We did not observe an effect of coldness on social distance
toward the sacrificed victims or an effect of social distance on
empathy. Therefore, coldness might directly activate empathy-
related concepts (e.g., cold-hearted) and reduce empathic con-
cerns. Note that the present experiment asked individuals to
evaluate the overlap between themselves and the victims as a
whole, and this effect might be different from participants to par-
ticipants, in which case the victim is more vividly remembered
(e.g., a man on the footbridge or a crying baby). Consequently,
it is possible that the results of the IOS scale did not reflect
the social distance toward victims as a whole; rather, it reflected
the differences in social distance toward the vividly remem-
bered victim. In addition, present experiment did not measure
social distance toward saved people, and did not separately ask
empathic concern toward the sacrificing victim and toward the
saved people. Previous studies of temperature and social cog-
nition presented neutral person, not a suffering person, as a
target (Williams and Bargh, 2008), therefore coldness might affect
social distance and empathic concern toward not only sacrific-
ing victims but also saved people. It is plausible that coldness
increased social distance toward all people in the dilemma sce-
nario and decreased empathic feelings during the judgment, and
then prompted utility-based judgment. Further research will be
needed to test whether the effect of temperature on empathy is
mediated by social proximity, and whether the coldness affects
social proximity and empathy toward the sacrificing victim or all
people in the scenario.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The present experiments provide preliminary evidence that phys-
ical coldness prompted utilitarian moral decisions by making
people more “cold-hearted”; rather than “cool-headed.” There
are three ways to facilitate utilitarian judgment. The first is to
engage in deliberate thought to suppress an immediate emotional
response (Greene et al., 2008). The second is to focus on abstract
goals (Aguilar et al., 2013), and the third is to reduce empathic
concern and decrease aversion to sacrificing others (Wiech et al.,
2013). The results of Experiment 1 indicate that the effect of
coldness on moral dilemma judgment was independent from
“cool-headed,” deliberate thought or from the abstract, high-level
construal mindset. Experiment 2 suggests that the effect of cold-
ness on moral dilemma judgment was partially mediated by a
reduction of empathic feelings. Previous studies have pointed out
that individuals higher on psychoticism or psychopathy scales,
which are characterized by a lack of empathic concern, showed
utilitarian judgment without engaging in rational-deliberate pro-
cessing (Wiech et al., 2013). Therefore, an extremely cold tem-
perature led to people being labeled as “cold-hearted.” They
exhibited a less empathic state andmore easily accepted utilitarian
decisions.
Studies of moral dilemma judgment showed scenarios that
involved physical contact or personal force elicited fewer util-
itarian decisions (Cushman et al., 2006; Greene et al., 2009).
Our present experiments reveal that embodiment actually affects
moral dilemma judgment, and the results imply that temperature
perception underlie social relationships and morality. Intimate
social relationships such as communal sharing relationships are
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scaffolded onto physical experiences like touching others and
sensing others’ temperature (IJzerman and Koole, 2011; Rai and
Fiske, 2011), and thus temperature perception may cue commu-
nal sharing relationships and unity moral motives, which directs
to take care in-group member and activate empathy and compas-
sion. Present experiments support these views: coldness decreased
empathic feeling and increase utilitarian moral decisions. Thus,
temperature perception or physical contact may activate concepts
of close relationship with others, and directed moral emotions
and judgments.
Future research needs to focus on several issues that still
remain unanswered. The first is the relationship between tem-
perature, social distance, and moral judgment. It needs to be
determined whether coldness increases the social distance toward
the sacrificed victims, or if just activates the concept related to
coldness. The second issue is the bidirectional feature of temper-
ature perception and social cognition (Zhong and Leonardelli,
2008; IJzerman and Semin, 2010). Do utilitarian decisions induce
people to perceive physical coldness? The third issue is more
automatic and involves the unconscious effect of temperature
on moral dilemma judgment. Moretto et al. (2010) showed that
patients with emotion-related brain regions (e.g., vmPFC) made
more utilitarian judgment and failed to generate a SCR before
making utilitarian judgment. Wiech et al. (2013) indicated that
participants with antisocial psychoticism traits showed less acti-
vation of the subgenual cingulate cortex, which is related to
empathic concerns, during their utilitarian judgment making.
Therefore, further research is needed to test whether temperature
affects the automatic emotional response during moral dilemma
judgment by measuring SCRs or brain activation.
In conclusion, it is important to be aware that our moral
judgment and empathic feelings are affected by temperature per-
ception. Gockel et al. (2014) revealed that ambient temperature
affects the judgment of criminals: participants in a lower tempera-
ture room regarded criminals as more cold-blooded and ascribed
higher degrees of penalties to them. Similarly, present results
imply that coldness affects a jury’s empathic concern toward a
victim, thereby affecting a verdict. The present study bridges
embodied cognition and moral judgment and implies that our
morality is scaffolded onto the our bodily experiences.
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Table and forest plot about the meta-analysis of mean dif-
ferences between cold condition and ordinary condition in
moral acceptability of high-conflict moral dilemma is available
at Supplementary materials. Post-hoc analysis revealed statistical
power of the difference between cold and ordinary temperature
condition in moral acceptability of high-conflict moral dilemma
was 0.83 in Experiment 1, and 0.78 in Experiment 2 (one-
tailed). To increase statistical power, we conducted meta-analysis
of Experiments 1 and 2 (Cohn and Becker, 2003). The results
showed that temperature manipulation affected acceptability of
high conflict moral dilemma dunbiased = 0.78 [0.346, 1.203].
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